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Abstract
Background: The continuing circulation of MERS in the Middle East makes the international dissemination of the
disease a permanent threat. To inform risk assessment, we investigated the spatiotemporal pattern of MERS global
dissemination and looked for factors explaining the heterogeneity observed in transmission events following
importation.
Methods: We reviewed imported MERS cases worldwide up to July 2015. We modelled importations in time based
on air travel combined with incidence in Middle East. We used the detailed history of MERS case management after
importation (time to hospitalization and isolation, number of hospitals visited,…) in logistic regression to identify
risk factors for secondary transmission. We assessed changes in time to hospitalization and isolation in relation to
collective and public health attention to the epidemic, measured by three indicators (Google Trends, ProMED-mail,
Disease Outbreak News).
Results: Modelled importation events were found to reproduce both the temporal and geographical structure of
those observed – the Pearson correlation coefficient between predicted and observed monthly time series was
large (r = 0.78, p < 10−4). The risk of secondary transmission following importation increased with the time to case
isolation or death (OR = 1.7 p = 0.04) and more precisely with the duration of hospitalization (OR = 1.7, p = 0.02). The
average daily number of secondary cases was 0.02 [0.0,0.12] in the community and 0.20 [0.03,9.0] in the hospital.
Time from hospitalisation to isolation decreased in periods of high public health attention (2.33 ± 0.34 vs. 6.44 ± 0.97 days
during baseline attention).
Conclusions: Countries at risk of importation should focus their resources on strict infection control measures for the
management of potential cases in healthcare settings and on prompt MERS cases identification. Individual and collective
awareness are key to substantially improve such preparedness.
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Background
Concern with the Middle East respiratory syndrome
(MERS) remains high among public health authorities
worldwide due to the failure to stop the spread of the
disease three years after its first description [1]. As of
February 2016, 26 countries reported cases, for a total of
1,626 laboratory-confirmed cases of infection with MERS
[2]. Cases outside the Middle East region were either trav-
ellers or had close contact with imported cases.
The majority of case importation events led to little or
no secondary transmission, as expected due to the low
human-to-human transmission risk [3–7]. Yet, in May
2015, a case imported to South Korea triggered the lar-
gest outbreak outside the Middle East, with a total of
186 confirmed cases [2]. This large epidemic was quite
unexpected and calls for a better understanding of the
potential for MERS dissemination worldwide and risk of
onward transmission.
* Correspondence: chiara.poletto@inserm.fr
1Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Univ Paris 06, INSERM, Institut Pierre Louis
d’épidémiologie et de Santé Publique (IPLESP UMRS 1136), 75012 Paris,
France
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Poletto et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:448 
DOI 10.1186/s12879-016-1787-5
It has been proposed that countries having a high risk
of MERS importation were those receiving the most air
passengers from the Middle East [5, 8]. Joint analysis of
incidence data in the Middle East region with inter-
national travel flows allowed estimating the expected
number of MERS introductions in countries outside the
affected area [9, 10], for example on coming back from
pilgrimage in Mecca [9] or distinguishing between resi-
dents and visitors [10]. In the latter, predictions were
based on cumulative attack rates per country in the af-
fected area [10], thus disregarding the strong temporal
nature of MERS epidemic [11].
In case of importation of a case, experience has shown
that household and nosocomial transmission was possible
[12–14] with infrequent large outbreaks as in South Korea
[2]. A marked heterogeneity in the epidemic outcome fol-
lowing importation has been observed and characterized by
transmission trees in South Korea [15] and theoretical re-
sults regarding the potential for multiple generations [16]
and role of super-spreading events [16, 17]. Yet a compre-
hensive understanding of the risk factors for local transmis-
sion once a MERS case is imported is still missing.
Here we aimed at providing a comprehensive analysis
of the risk of MERS importation and subsequent onward
transmission through a systematic analysis of all known
MERS importation events. We produced predictions
based on air traffic data for the risk of MERS importation
and estimated the expected number of symptomatic cases
imported in countries outside the affected area – here
defined as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Bahrain, and also referred
to as Middle East. The analysis accounted for seasonal var-
iations of air traffic flows and for temporal and spatial var-
iations of MERS incidence in the Middle East. Predictions
were validated against confirmed importations and lack
thereof. Focusing on onward transmission, we analysed
the risk for local transmission according to sources of
heterogeneity in terms of individual awareness (time to
hospital admission, declaration of history of travel),
country’s reaction (baseline hospital protocols, heightening
of infection control strategies), cultural aspects and local
customs (e.g. health-seeking behaviour) and phase of the
outbreak. We modelled the outcome of importation events
according to how cases were identified and managed to
provide quantitative estimates on the expected number of
secondary cases in the community and in the hospital
setting. We finally explored whether MERS awareness
in different communities at the time of importation af-
fected case management.
Methods
Data collection on imported cases
Confirmed cases by World Health Organisation
(WHO) between September 1, 2012 and July 31, 2015
were considered with the exclusion of repatriations events
[18]. We focused on cases with clear and documented
travel origin. We thus excluded cases with no association
to travel and cases in countries in the Middle East region,
here defined as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait,
Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Bahrain, where
continuous sporadic cases are documented.
For each importation event, we collected from the
scientific literature, Disease Outbreak News of WHO
(DON-WHO), and other official public health sources
the following information: dates of travel and symp-
toms onset, date of suspected MERS-CoV infection and
date of confirmation, date of hospital admission, date of
case isolation or death, declaration of travel history, number
of secondary cases generated by the imported case,
hospitalization history. Information was primarily extracted
by one of us (CP) and double-checked by others (PYB, VC).
Model-predicted number of imported cases
We modeled imported cases out of Middle East during
the same period as above based on air-traffic data and
observed incidence in the source region. We used air-traffic
worldwide provided by the International Air Transport
Association [19]. The dataset refers to 2013 and includes
monthly number of origin–destination trips connecting
3362 urban areas distributed on all countries. We extended
the dataset to the whole study period by assuming perfect
annual periodicity. For reported cases in Middle East we
considered the official counts published in the Disease Out-
break News of WHO and recovered from [20, 21]. We ag-
gregated incidence by week and we grouped cases spatially
in 20 regions corresponding to the provinces of Saudi
Arabia and the other countries. We computed the number
of MERS-CoV infections exported each week to a destin-
ation country outside Middle East assuming that infected
individuals have the possibility to travel before hospitalized.
We accounted for the distribution of time from infection to
hospitalization, computed as the convolution of the incuba-
tion period distribution and that of onset to hospitalization
(see Additional file 1 for the details). To estimate actual
number of importations we adjusted incidence in Middle
East for reporting ratio. The latter was computed by assum-
ing 100 % detection accuracy in imported cases in Euro-
pean and North-American countries, where alertness and
surveillance have been high to detect importations [22–24].
Eventually, we computed the predictive probability of
the weekly number of importation cases worldwide de-
pending on how many cases were reported in the Middle
East in the past month. Further details are reported in
the Additional file 1.
Risk of transmission following importation
We studied the factors affecting the risk of transmission
following importation. We used bias reduced logistic
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regression to analyse the outcome of each imported case,
classified as “with secondary case” vs. “without second-
ary case” [25].
We then modelled the number of secondary cases fol-
lowing importation assuming a Poisson process. Several
versions of the model were explored to test potential de-
terminants of the observed heterogeneity in transmission.
The first factor considered was the presence/absence of
dependence of transmission on the setting (community vs.
hospital), as accounted for by models S+ and S- respect-
ively. We then considered possible dependence on the
total duration of the transmission risk period (with, model
D+, vs. without, model D-). This was defined as the dur-
ation from symptoms onset or date of travel, if travelling
after symptoms onset, to isolation or death. For models
S+ we used setting-specific transmission risk periods.
Eventually we compare presence/absence of heterogeneity
in transmission between patients (with, model P+, vs.
without, model P-). The decomposition tested in the
models accounts for the aspects that were shown to be
relevant in the heterogeneity of transmission by the risk
analysis. Notice that in all models tested we assumed that
no transmission is possible after patient isolation. To ac-
count for duration we set the mean of the Poisson distri-
bution to μCdC + μHdH, where dC and dH were the number
of days in the community and in hospital, and μC and μH
the average number of secondary cases per day in each
setting. Overdispersion in transmission was introduced by
replacing μH with a Gamma-distributed random param-
eter mH with mean μH and standard deviation σH. We fur-
ther distinguished between a model with over-dispersion
of transmission only in the hospital (P+/D+/S+), and a
model accounting for such a level of heterogeneity in both
hospital and community (P++/D+/S+). All listed transmis-
sion hypotheses yielded 8 different models that were fitted
to the data and compared by the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC). More details on the analysis are reported in
the Additional file 1.
Collective attention and awareness and relation with
imported case history
As possible external factor affecting the history of im-
portation events, we studied the effect of attention or
awareness as obtained from various digital sources. We
focused on three indicators: the popularity of the search
query [“novel coronavirus” OR “MERS-CoV”] in Google
Trends, as an indicator for collective attention in the
general public; the number of alerts published by
ProMED-mail with the same keywords, as an indicator
of attention in the international infectious disease com-
munity; and the number of DON on MERS published by
WHO, as an indicator of official source of information
for public health authorities.
Each source provided a time-series spanning the whole
study period; values were scaled to range between 0 and
1 at the time-series maximum. For each indicator, we
computed the correlation coefficient between the time
spent in the community or in the hospital and the attention
level at the occurrence date of these events. We defined pe-
riods of high attention as those where the indicator value
was in its upper quartile distribution. We compared the
length of the periods spent in the community or in the
hospital before isolation occurring in high attention pe-
riods or in the remaining baseline periods. Alternative
definitions of the threshold for high attention periods
were tested (Additional file 1).
Results
Risk of MERS importation
A total of 22 importation events were reported world-
wide (see Table 1 and Additional file 1): nine in Europe
(41 %), six in Asia (27 %), five in Africa (23 %), and two
in North America (9 %). All cases were symptomatic.
Confirmed secondary cases following importation were
observed on four occasions (two in Europe, one in Africa,
and one in Asia). Two further secondary cases in Italy
were not confirmed by WHO [18, 26, 27] and were only
investigated in the sensitivity analysis. Exception made for
the CH1 case who travelled from South Korea, all cases
were originating from Middle East. Importation events
were reported throughout the whole study period, with
half of them occurring during 2014. Cases with associated
confirmed transmissions following importation occurred
during 2013 (UK1, FR1, TUN1) and 2015 (SK1). Timeline
of importations is summarised in Fig. 1a.
The comparison between predicted and observed
exported cases from Middle East is reported in Fig. 1b.
Confirmed MERS importations occurred when com-
puted expected number of cases was large. The Pearson
correlation coefficient between the observed and pre-
dicted number of cases flying out of the Middle-East
region each month was 0.78 (p < 10− 4).
At the country level (Fig. 2a), we found that countries
experiencing importation cases had indeed a higher ex-
pected probability of importing a case (Wilcoxon test
p < 10− 4). Five of the ten countries with the highest
probability of importing cases actually reported im-
portation cases: these were mostly European countries.
The remaining five did not report importation cases
despite being at high risk of importation: these included
countries in South-East Asia (e.g. India, Pakistan,
Indonesia and Bangladesh). Observed number of im-
portation cases matched prediction in all countries, ex-
cept for India, Egypt and Pakistan (Fig. 2b). Among
European and North-American countries observed im-
portations were even more strongly associated with model
predictions: 100 % of the top five countries registered at
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least one case, and 70 % of top ten, see Additional file 1:
Figure S2.
Building on the good agreement between observed
and predicted cases worldwide, we analyse the risk of
importation events that would be expected according to
a given disease activity in the Middle East. Figure 3 re-
ports the probability of observing at least one imported
case in each continent according to the number of cases
observed in the Middle East over the last month (see
Additional file 1: Figure S3 for predicted number of im-
portations). Following a month with increased disease
incidence in the Middle-East (more than 100 cases – for
example April 2014 or August 2015), the probability of
having at least 1 case would be 64 % in Asia, 32 % in Africa,
18 % in Europe, 7 % in the Americas and 0 in Oceania.
Risk of transmission following importation
For each MERS-confirmed imported case, we recon-
structed the detailed case history (Fig. 4). In the four
events where local transmission was confirmed, the dur-
ation of the transmission risk period, from symptoms
onset or date of travel if symptomatic to isolation or
death, was longer than in others (11.8 days vs. 5.4, p =
0.007). FR1, SK1, and UK1 were characterised by a long
hospitalisation period (ten days for UK1, nine days for
FR1 and SK1) and a short period in the community (two
days or less). TUN1 showed a longer period in the com-
munity (eight days) than in the hospital (six days). Im-
portation events with no local transmission had shorter
duration of hospitalisation on average (2.9 vs. 8.5 days).
The number of visited hospitals prior to isolation ranged
between one and four (four visited by SK1).
Results of the bias reduced logistic regression show
that imported cases with the longest transmission risk
period more frequently had secondary cases (OR = 1.7,
CI 95 % [1.2,6.7]), all the more when more time was
spent in the hospital (OR = 1.7 [1.2,7.3]). Number of
clinics visited was also associated to increased risk of
transmission. The small sample made it difficult to con-
clude for other characteristics, although it suggested an
increased probability for secondary cases if onset oc-
curred after travelling, and if history of travel to the
Middle East region was not reported (Table 2).
Results of the AIC comparison among transmission
models are reported in Table 3. We found that the models
allowing over-dispersion of transmission in the hospital
provided a better fit to the data. The best fit was obtained
with model P+/D+/S+. Model P+/D+/S-, where transmis-
sion in and outside the hospital was similar, performed
nearly as well as the best model. Model P++/D+/S+,
Table 1 Case importation events of MERS to countries outside of the Middle East region
# Case ID Country Date of travel Date of onset of symptoms Date of MERS confirmation Sec. cases
1 UK1 United Kingdom 28/1/13 24/1/13 8/2/13 2
2 FR1 France 17/4/13 22/4/13 7/5/13 1
3 IT1 Italy 25/5/13 24/5/13 31/5/13 0
4 TUN1 Tunisia 28/4/13 28/4/13 8/5/13 1
5 TUN2 Tunisia 10/5/13 11/5/13 16/5/13 0
6 MA1 Malaysia 28/3/14 04/4/14 14/4/14 0
7 G1 Greece 17/4/14 prior to traveling 18/4/15 0
8 EG1 Egypt 25/4/14 22/4/14 26/4/14 0
9 US1 United States 24/4/14 18/4/14 2/5/14 0
10 US2 United States 1/5/14 1/5/14 9/5/14 0
11 NETH1 The Netherlands 10/5/14 01/5/14 13/5/14 0
12 NETH2 The Netherlands 10/5/14 05/5/14 14/5/14 0
13 AL1 Algeria 28/5/14 23/5/14 30/5/14 0
14 AL2 Algeria 29/5/14 23/5/14 30/5/14 0
15 A1 Austria 22/9/14 prior to traveling 29/9/14 0
16 TUR1 Turkey 6/10/14 25/9/14 - 0
17 PH1 Philippines 1/2/15 26/1/15 10/2/15 0
18 GE1 Germany 8/2/15 11/2/15 7/3/15 0
19 SK1 South Korea 4/5/15 11/5/15 20/5/15 31
20 CH1 China 26/5/15 21/5/15 28/5/15 0
21 TH1 Thailand 15/6/15 10/6/15 18/6/15 0
22 PH2 Philippines 19/6/15 30/6/15 4/7/15 0
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where overdispersion was present in the community and
in the hospital performed more poorly, essentially because
the variance of the random coefficients was not well esti-
mated. Community parameters were estimated with a very
large variance showing that the likelihood was almost flat
and the model difficult to identify.
Parameters estimated with the two best fitting models
are listed in Table 4. In the best fitting model estimated
average daily secondary cases was ten times smaller in
the community than in the hospital. The importation
events causing secondary transmissions had larger model-
predicted probabilities of transmission (Fig. 5). Finally, the
model showed that most importations were likely to cause
less than five secondary cases, especially when time to
isolation was short. It also showed that outbreaks lead-
ing to more than 30 cases were possible, although with
a relatively small probability (1–5 % predicted for the South
Korean episode). In model P+/D+/S-, the probabilities of a
large number of secondary cases following importation
were larger than in the best fitting model (see Additional
file 1: Figure S4).
Accounting for the unconfirmed secondary cases in
Italy yielded similar association between infectious risk
period and increased transmission risk, but less marked
evidence for setting-specific differences in transmission
(Additional file 1).
Collective attention and awareness and relation with
imported case history
Trends of attention measured by the three indicators
showed similar profiles, with periods of high popularity in-
terspersed within periods of lower attention in the various
sources (Fig. 6a). The correlations between indicators were
large, ranging between 0.65 (Google Trends vs. DON-
WHO, p < 10− 4) and 0.86 (ProMED-mail vs. DON-WHO,
p < 10− 4). The latter is expected as ProMED-mail contains
Fig. 1 MERS importation events. a Timeline of confirmed importation events. The height of the bar is proportional to the number of importations
registered in the month, and imported cases’ IDs are listed close to the bar. Importation events causing secondary transmissions are highlighted
with a box. All cases originated from travels from the Middle East (red bars), except the case imported in China (CH1, blue bar) who travelled
from South Korea. b Expected weekly number of MERS exportation to countries out of Middle East as a function of time. The average weekly
number of exportations is indicated with the dashed line. Blue diamonds indicate observed exportations (detailed in panel a)
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all news of DON-WHO. ProMED-mail and DON-WHO
showed more variation over time than Google Trends,
where fewer and more distinct peaks were observed. Peaks
were more likely to occur following MERS related events
(Fig. 6a), such as e.g. the confirmation of MERS infection in
imported cases worldwide (UK1, FR1) or the outbreaks in
Saudi Arabia (Spring 2014 and February 2015) [2].
We compared the length of the periods spent in the
community or in the hospital before isolation with the
attention level at the occurrence date of these events.
The duration from hospitalisation to isolation was larger
in periods of low attention for all three indicators. The
correlation coefficient was -0.66 (p = 0.001) between dur-
ation and Google Trends attention level (Fig. 6b), -0.69
(p = 0.0005) for ProMED-mail, and -0.58 (p = 0.005) for
DON-WHO (Additional file 1: Figure S5).
More precisely, we found that the imported cases in
Italy (IT1), Greece (G1), United States (US1 and US2),
Algeria (AL1 and AL2), Egypt (EG1), the Netherlands
(NETH1 and NETH2), Germany (GE1), Thailand (TH1),
and Philippines (PH2), all hospitalised during periods of
high attention (Fig. 6c), had average time from hospi-
talisation to isolation of 2.33 ± 0.34 days compared to
6.44 ± 0.97 days computed for cases occurring when
attention was lower (Fig. 6d).
All indicators of attention yielded similar results, with
more rapid isolation in periods of high attention (Fig. 6d).
Fig. 2 MERS importations by country. a Risk of importation by country worldwide. Confirmed importations are signalled by black symbols.
b Observed vs. predicted number of MERS imported cases by country over the whole study period. Top 50 countries ranked by the predicted
number of importations are shown (including all reported importations). Bars indicate the 95 % prediction interval
Fig. 3 Probability of observing at least one case within a week as a
function of the observed epidemic activity at the source in the
preceding month. Different curves correspond to different continents
Poletto et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:448 Page 6 of 13
XX ICU in the hospital X
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TUN1 A A A A A
GE1 A A A A B
UK1 A B B B B B C C C
SK1 A A A B B B C 
D
D D
FR1 A A A B A A C C
PH1 A A A A A A A A
US2 A
MA1 A B C
US1 A A
A1 (*) A A B B C
NETH2




TH1 A A A
CH1
AL1 A A A




(*) symptom onset before arrival, no information on the date
time (days)
Fig. 4 Case history of MERS importations. Cases are aligned to the beginning of the infectious risk period, i.e. the most recent between the
importation date and the date of symptoms onset. Days in the infection risk period are color-coded according to the patient’s history, ending
with isolation (dark red) or death (black). Importation events are sorted by duration of the infection risk period. Where no information was
available on time of isolation, we assumed infection risk period to end with case confirmation. A box is used to highlight cases that led to
secondary transmission
Table 2 Risk factors for secondary cases after importation
(univariate analysis)
Variable OR 95 % CI P
Onset before importation 0.2 [0.00, 1.7] 0.19
Infection risk period (per day) 1.7 [1.2, 6.7] 0.04
Time before hospitalization (per day) 1.1 [0.7, 1.6] 0.62
Time in the hospital (per day) 1.7 [1.2, 7.3] 0.02
Number of visited healthcare facilities 3.3 [1.2, 25.4] 0.05
Declared history of travela (No vs. Yes) 8.2 [0.32, 625] 0.21
ainformation available for 15 cases out of 22
Table 3 AIC values for all model tested
Model AIC
P D S
- - - 197.1
- + - 150.0
- + + 141.1
+ - - 45.5
+ + - 43.4
+ + + 43.3
++ + + 46.0
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Two cases occurring outside Google Trends high atten-
tion periods were nevertheless isolated quickly and cap-
tured by the other indicators (CH1 occurring in a period
of high attention for ProMED-mail and DON-WHO,
MA1 during high attention for DON-WHO). There was
no substantial difference when criteria for the calcula-
tion of the moving average and thresholds defining high
attention were varied (Additional file 1).
Attention was not found to impact duration of the
community period. For the case of attention measured
by Google Trends, for example, we obtained a Pearson
correlation coefficient between attention and length of
stay in the community equal to 0.22 (p = 0.32). Average
values in periods of high and baseline attention were re-
spectively 2.85 ± 0.83 and 2.44 ± 0.74. Also in this case
results were robust in varying criteria for the moving
average calculation and the high attention definition.
Discussion
The large number of cases reported in the South Korean
outbreak following a MERS case importation generated
substantial concern on the risks that countries face to-
wards importation and possible onward transmission.
Our quantitative analysis provide important information
that can help preparedness and response to such events:
MERS international dissemination is strongly associated
to air travel flows combined with cases incidence in the
source area; transmission is more likely to occur in
hospitals; large outbreaks are possible though rare; and
high attention to MERS epidemic in the public and
among professionals lead to efficient case management.
The role of air travel as driver for pathogen international
dissemination has been considered in several prospective
studies [28–37], with few retrospective validations
[33, 38–42]. For the case of MERS [5, 8–10], qualitative
comparisons between predictions and observed importa-
tions were presented [9, 10]. Our analysis produces the
first quantitative assessment of the accuracy of model pre-
dictions for the risk of importation worldwide accounting
for all countries with and without reported importations.
In addition, importation risk and expected number of
imported cases is evaluated across time. The temporal
factor is often neglected when dealing with subcritical
epidemic as in the case of MERS and overall attack
rates are generally considered [10]. MERS epidemic was
shown however to display a strong temporal component,
both in the zoonotic and human-to-human transmission
[11]. Here we found indeed that such temporal variation
also affects the expected number of exportations from the
Middle East region. The largest concentration of exporta-
tions (nine episodes from March to May 2014) occurred
during the outbreaks affecting the provinces of Riyadh and
Makkah in Saudi Arabia in Spring 2014, causing a 18-fold
increase in the expected number of exportations. Spatial
resolution is also important, as already highlighted in [10]
with a country-level description. Here we considered a
Table 4 Parameters estimated for the two best fitting models
Model Parameters
P D S μC μH σC σH
+ + - 0.15 [0.04,1.69] 0.53 [0.16, 8.7]
+ + + 0.02 [0.0, 0.12] 0.20 [0.03, 9.0] - 0.73 [0.20, 75.0]
Fig. 5 Model-predicted probability of secondary cases after importation. (left, middle) Model predicted probability of at least one secondary case
(left), of more than one secondary case (middle) as a function of the time spent in the community and in the hospital prior to isolation or death.
In red countries that experienced local transmission generating at least one secondary case (left) or more than one secondary case (middle). (right)
Model predicted probability of the number of secondary cases as a function of the time spent in the hospital, assuming 3 days in the community
before hospitalisation
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total of 20 regions in the affected area, including the
countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Bahrain similarly to [10],
and additionally disaggregating Saudi Arabia into its 13
provinces [11].
A further element of novelty of the present study is its
ability to provide projections on the expected number of
importations by country with no prior knowledge on ei-
ther MERS epidemiology or under-reporting ratio. This is
possible by relying on three main assumptions: (i) 100 %
detection accuracy of MERS surveillance in countries of
European Union and North America; (ii) uniform under-
reporting of cases in the affected area in time and space
[11]; (iii) homogeneous mixing between travellers and
local residents.
The third assumption may be responsible for some of
the limitations of the model. The major discrepancy we
found between predictions and observations is the large
risk of importation predicted for India, Pakistan, and
Indonesia, though these countries did not report any
MERS case. This was also observed in [10]. It may suggest
that cases were imported in these countries but went un-
detected. However it may also be due to non-homogeneity
in the mixing or travel behaviour of classes of individuals,
namely travellers to the affected area vs. region residents,
that is known to impact the conditions for pathogen dis-
semination [43]. Non-homogeneous mixing may affect
travellers’ probability to be infected by the virus because
of altered risk of contact with zoonotic sources or of ex-
posure to nosocomial outbreaks. This may vary among
Fig. 6 Relation between attention and time from hospitalisation to isolation. a Attention as measured by Google Trends, ProMED-mail and DON-WHO
from January 2013 to July 2015. Dates corresponding to specific epidemic events are shown on the top of the plot. b Duration of hospitalisation versus
attention (from the Google Trends indicator) at the time of admission to the hospital. c Timeline of attention (Google Trends, right axis) and duration
from hospitalisation to isolation for each imported case (left axis), at the time of admission to the hospital. Periods of high attention are indicated by
vertical shaded areas. Importation events are coloured according to attention level at their time of hospitalisation (red for high attention, orange
otherwise). d Average duration from hospitalisation to isolation in periods of high and baseline attention for three indicators (GT= Google Trends,
DON= Don of WHO, PM= ProMED-mail). Error bars show standard errors
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travellers and be related for instance to different purpose
of visit (e.g. short-visit tourists vs. seasonal workers). The
similarity of findings regarding high-risk countries be-
tween our study and previous work [10], notwithstanding
different modelling assumptions, suggests that country-
specific aspects may be determinant for the observed dis-
crepancy. On one side there is a surveillance system whose
accuracy may vary by country. On the other, purpose of
visit and associated mixing may be country-related. India,
Pakistan, and Indonesia are indeed in the top 4 national-
ities in the expat community in Saudi Arabia [44].
The detailed analysis of the history following import-
ation provided important findings on the risk of a local
outbreak generated by an infected traveller. While no
secondary cases were reported in the majority of observed
importation events, four events led to one (in two in-
stances), two, or 31 secondary cases. This heterogeneity
was captured by our models through large overdispersion
in transmission, in agreement with previous works
[15–17]. Our findings suggest that the probability to ob-
serve a future MERS importation leading to a number of
secondary cases larger than the South Korean one is of the
order of 1-5 %, consistent with prior work on the full
nosocomial South Korean outbreak [15]. In line with an-
other study, the risk of observing a secondary case is pre-
dicted to be larger than 20 % if isolation in hospital is not
fast (>one week), independently of the time spent in the
community [16].
The observed variability in epidemic outcomes may re-
sult from at least four characteristics. First, the duration
of the transmission risk period in the destination country,
from date of importation or symptoms onset to isolation
or death, is clearly an important risk factor for local trans-
mission. The longer the transmission risk period, the lar-
ger are the opportunities for susceptible individuals to be
exposed to the infectious case, both in the community and
after hospitalization.
Second, nosocomial transmission of MERS appeared
more efficient than transmission in the community. This
points to the need for focusing interventions on rapid
case identification and effective isolation and for improv-
ing infection control protocols in hospitals to prevent
transmission. The large outbreak observed in South
Korea was indeed attributed to sub-optimal infection
prevention and control measures in hospitals [45]. These
findings are in line with previous analyses on MERS
transmission in healthcare settings and with modelling
studies evaluating the impact of mechanisms to control
SARS spread in 2003 [15, 46–48].
The third aspect pertains to heterogeneity in case find-
ing and management. For example, imported cases could
visit one to four health-care facilities before getting a
diagnosis. This behaviour may be based on individuals’
decisions but it may also be induced by country-specific
regulations of the national health-care system that deter-
mines how patients can access professionals or it may be
influenced by local customs. This behaviour was found
to be associated with a higher probability of secondary
transmission in our study, indicating that the local prac-
tice of seeking care in multiple health-care facilities may
have contributed to the initial spread in South Korea, in
agreement with the findings of Ref. [45].
The fourth aspect is represented by lack of individual
awareness regarding the potential risk that was found to
be a contributing factor increasing transmission risk.
Indeed, not reporting a history of travel to the health
practitioners increased the probability of having secondary
cases (although not statistically significant). For emerging
diseases whose non-specific symptoms preclude a fast
diagnosis, travel history is a critical element for patient
assessment. Moreover, cases who experienced onset of
symptoms before importation were less likely to gener-
ate secondary cases. Traveling while ill from a country
where a MERS outbreak is ongoing increased individual
awareness on the infection risk and induced a more
precautionary individual behaviour. Clearly, these two
aspects are correlated, as 70 % of the cases who declared
history of travel also travelled while ill.
We explored three digital indicators for collective
attention and awareness corresponding to different
communities: general population, professionals and health
authorities. Digital sources have been recently used in the
context of early detection and surveillance [49, 50]. They
have also been used as a source to study public concern in
response to an ongoing epidemic threat [49, 51].
Our analysis showed that general public’s attention
measured by Google Trends is highly correlated with the
amount of news circulating amongst the international
infectious disease community (ProMED-mail) and of of-
ficial reports published by the WHO. Its curve in time
shows the presence of high peaks followed by a quick
decline. This is a common behaviour generally found in
the social media response following specific triggering
events [49, 52, 53]. In our study, events triggering collect-
ive attention can be identified with unexpected episodes of
case importations or resurgence of the epidemic in the
affected area.
Here we found that MERS confirmation and isolation
during peaks of collective attention were considerably
faster. This suggests that an increased collective aware-
ness may induce changes in the management of the pa-
tient allowing the health system to successfully reduce
the time from admission to isolation. Being this time
critical for transmission risk, increased awareness is
identified as a key factor to control the generation of
cases after MERS importation. Similar results were also
obtained for the indicators measuring awareness in the
public health and infectious diseases community. The
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case importation in South Korea occurred when attention
was at its baseline level (as measured by all indicators),
and indeed it was reported that MERS appearance was
“unfamiliar to most physicians” in the country [54].
No correlation was found instead between collective
attention and time to admission. This suggests that col-
lective attention may preferably act on the case manage-
ment by health authorities, whereas individual awareness
may more likely be responsible for individual change of
health-seeking behaviour, as discussed previously.
The impact of collective awareness and public health
mobilization strategies in response to an epidemic has
already been observed in past outbreak. As SARS outbreak
progressed, reduced duration from onset to hospital ad-
mission and reduced number of hospital visits per patient
were observed due to overall increased awareness and
public health recommendations [47, 55–57]. Similarly,
during the South Korean outbreak of MERS, infection
control measures strengthened, and the delay from illness
onset to confirmation shortened as the epidemic pro-
gressed [58, 59].
There are however two important differences between
our findings and the above. First, awareness and concerns
are known to be stronger for the population experiencing
the outbreak (as in the above cases) than for yet un-
affected populations (as in our study) [53]. Nonetheless,
our findings show that higher awareness, even when in-
duced by non-local events, allow countries to better
manage an importation episode. Second, here we were
able to explicitly measure awareness in time and relate
it to a quantifiable change of behaviour (case manage-
ment), further illustrating its impact on transmission.
From the use of surveys to digital data, quantifying
awareness has become an important aspect of epidemic
surveillance and control [49, 51, 60–62]. Few studies
have however measured how variation in awareness af-
fects an epidemic during its course [50, 63]. Moreover,
MERS poses additional challenges as public attention is
known to wane rapidly in response to external events [64]
unless it is prompted by additional triggering events or
mounting concern, as it happened with the rapidly in-
creasing number of cases of Ebola epidemic [5]. The
subcritical nature of MERS epidemic, with an incidence
characterized by subcritical spread and sporadic peaks
[11], induces a similarly fragmented timeline of attention.
For example, the large peak of Spring 2014 increased
the risk of MERS dissemination. The management of
imported cases during that period however benefited
from an increased attention to the disease epidemic,
and no secondary transmission was observed. Con-
versely, despite the risk of importation was much lower
during the beginning of 2012 and Spring 2015, the few
importations observed during that period were able to
initiate local transmission and threaten the health security
of the destination countries. By analysing the various as-
pects characterizing the epidemic, our analysis is able to
identify the factors that may help improving the reaction
of countries at risk of importation.
Other limitations of our study need to be mentioned.
We assumed that no importation events had been missed
in Europe and estimated under-reporting in the Middle-
East accordingly. However, if 1 importation case had been
missed in Europe, underreporting would be 25 % rather
than 18 %, and the model-predicted number of cases
worldwide increase by 10 % over the period. If one further
assumes that secondary transmission was unlikely for
these unrecognized cases, the probability of transmission
following importation would be overestimated. For ex-
ample, taking the model-predicted number of importation
cases worldwide for the period as exact, the probability of
local transmission would have been 6 % (4 among 70)
rather than the current 18 % (4 among 22).
Furthermore, the second best-fitting model among the
ones considered for transmission following importation,
with only marginally larger AIC, did not support setting-
specific transmission. Our main result is however in line
with previous findings on nosocomial transmission of
MERS in the Middle East [15]. In addition, there were
two secondary cases in the Italian episode that were not
confirmed by official sources. Including these two cases
in the analysis, we still found that longer time to isola-
tion was associated with more secondary transmission,
although evidence on setting-specific differences in
transmission was less marked (see Additional file 1).
Conclusions
We evaluated the risk of MERS exportation worldwide
integrating seasonal air traffic flows and time-varying in-
cidence of cases in the affected area, and accounting for
under-reporting of cases. We conducted a comprehensive
analysis of all reported MERS imported cases to validate
modelled importation risk and assess onward transmis-
sion. Our findings confirm the critical role of air travel in
the risk of international dissemination. In case of MERS
introduction, prompt identification of the infection in pa-
tients seeking medical attention, strict infection control
measures, and effective isolation of the patient in the
nosocomial setting are key to efficient prevention and con-
trol of the outbreak. Increasing awareness at collective and
public health levels worldwide is found to be associated
with higher local preparedness, prompter and strength-
ened precautionary measures and isolation procedures to
prevent further spread. Our findings provide a quantitative
assessment for public heath authorities to face the variabil-
ity associated to importation risk and potential for local
transmission, to inform preparedness plans, and identify
the critical measures that should be considered to reduce
the likelihood of future outbreaks.
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